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A Directional Distance Function Approach 
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In Solow’s model the income convergence between countries arises from two main sources: a 
capital deepening effect resulting from the diminishing returns of the production technology 
and  a  technological  transfer/diffusion  effect  related  to  Total  Factor  Productivity  (TFP) 
differences. A large literature has been devoted to analyze these effects but most of the studies 
suffer from three weaknesses by defining the US as the a priori technological leader, by using 
a parametric functional form and by assuming constant returns to scale for the technology. 
Our paper offers an alternative approach based on a non-parametric programming framework 
and  the  estimation  of  directional  distance  functions.  We  explicitly  separate  country  TFP 
differences into two components: a technology effect and a scale effect to study the catching-
up process on each of them. We also analyze the role of the capital deepening effect by 
introducing a relevant measure of the structural efficiency which reveals inefficiencies due to 
changes in input-ratio differences. Our empirical work focuses on 15 European countries (EU) 
and the US over the period 1980-2004. We use time series procedures to test for convergence 
for individual countries or sub-sets of countries. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Relating to the convergence debate, it is well known that two processes lead to income 
convergence between countries: (1) capital deepening linked to its property of diminishing 
returns  and  (2)  technological  transfer/diffusion  related  to  Total  Factor  Productivity  (TFP) 
differences. The neoclassical standard theory assuming perfect capital mobility and identical 
technology, devoted most attention to the first process. In addition, standard growth theory 
presumes that technological progress is exogenous and is available to all at no cost and thus it 
says little about technology adoption. This was a restrictive assumption needed at that initial 
step of advance of the growth theory (Solow, 1994). Some researchers such as Jorgenson 
(1995), and Durlauf and Johnson (1995) had come to the conclusion that identical production 
technologies assumption may not hold. Abramovitz (1986) adopts a less radical approach by 
considering  a  common  available  technology  but  countries  may  differ  in  their  ability  to 
recognize, incorporate and use it. He introduced the concept of “social capabilities” to explain 
productivity gaps among countries. Therefore interest in cross-country TFP differences has 
become a key element to investigate economic growth (Islam, 2003).  
Since  the  end  of  the  eighties,  many  empirical  studies  focusing  on  international 
comparison of TFP have revealed that differences in technology may contribute to gaps in 
TFP levels
1. As TFP is an empirical measure of technology, the concept of TFP-convergence 
investigates whether countries are able to catch up in terms of highest observed TFP levels 
and how income convergence depends on both TFP growth rates and initial TFP levels. For 
example among others, Dowrick and Nguyen (1989) study TFP-convergence running a cross 
section regression of the TFP growth rates with the initial levels of TFP of fifteen OECD 
countries.  They  find  significant  evidence  of  TFP  catch-up  among  developed  countries. 
Nevertheless their analysis suffers from the restrictive assumption of a common capital-output 
ratio for all countries of the sample. With an aim of studying the interaction between technical 
change and the capital deepening component, Wolff (1991) implements the previous TFP 
catching-up equation with the capital/labor ratio growth rate and performs a regression to the 
G-7 countries. His results indicate a positive influence of capital accumulation on TFP catch-
up. Dougherty and Jorgenson (1997) compute TFP levels across the G-7 countries and show a 
decrease  of  their  coefficients  of  variation  over  time  illustrating  a  significant  process  of 
convergence.  
Empirical  research  on  TFP  growth  is  also  available  for  developing  or  new 
industrialized countries. For instance, Young (1992, 1994, 1995), Kim and Lau (1994) study 
sources of development for the East Asian economies and find a limited role of the TFP 
growth. Interpreting the above results, Krugman (1994) concludes that East Asian growth has 
been mainly due to factor accumulation. In opposition to this view, Collins and Bosworth 
(1997) and Klenow and Rodriguez (1997) evaluate a more significant contribution of TFP 
growth for some East Asian economies such as Singapore. These last conclusions stress the 
role of assimilation of new technology to explain the growth of the East Asian countries and 
are  in  line  with  the  interaction  between  technological  adoption  and  capital  accumulation 
leading to TFP growth.  
However, most of these previous studies suffer from three weaknesses. First, they used 
catching-up variables that define the US as the technological leader. Needless to say, the US 
was the only technological leader at the end of World War II,but this advantage has gradually 
changed and technological leadership is now probably widespread among different developed 
countries. Second, the technology level is evaluated with a TFP index measured as a Solow-
residual indicator with a particular functional form (Cobb–Douglas, CES, Translog…). Third, 
                                                            
1 See Islam (2001) for a review on different approaches to international comparisons of TFP and the issue of 
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TFP gaps may be in part due to the constant returns to scale assumption which does not take 
into account size heterogeneity across countries. These methodological choices may modify 
or bias the evaluation of the catching-up process.  
More recently, Kumar and Russell (2002) re-examine the catching-up mechanism with 
a methodology which avoids the two first above mentioned drawbacks. This methodology 
requires no a priori functional form on the world production frontier, nor any assumption 
about market structure. In addition, it does not specify a particular nation as the world leader 
allowing  for  technical  and/or  allocative  inefficiencies  to  arise  from  differences  in  the 
countries’ ability to use available technology. They test for the catching-up hypothesis across 
57 poor and rich nations, using labor productivity indexes calculated with a nonparametric 
method. To analyze the evolution of the cross-country distribution of labor productivity, they 
focus on differences in levels of technology, technological changes over time and how much 
of income convergence is due to technological diffusion or to convergence in capital/labor 
ratios. Their results conclude that there is evidence of technological catch-up, as countries 
have  on  the  whole  moved  toward  the  world  production  frontier,  non  neutrality  of 
technological change and a predominance of capital deepening as opposed to technological 
catch-up that contributes to both growth and income divergence of economies.  
Christopoulos  (2007)  also  considers  a  DEA  approach  to  measure  efficiency  and 
examines the impact of human capital and openness on productive performance in a sample of 
83  developed  and  less  developed  countries.  His  results  support  the  view  that  movements 
towards openness increase a country's efficiency performance significantly, whereas human 
capital  does  not  contribute  to  the  efficiency.  Nevertheless  his  analysis  still  relies  on  a 
restrictive constant returns to scale technology assumption.  
Using  a  similar  nonparametric  approach,  Färe  et  al.  (1994)  analyze  productivity 
growth in 17  OECD countries over the period  1979-1988. Their productivity indexes are 
decomposed into two components namely, technical change and efficiency change interpreted 
as a catching-up effect. Relaxing constant returns to scale assumption for the technology, they 
further  separate  the  catching-up  effect  into  two  terms:  one  representing  a  pure  technical 
efficiency change and an other measuring changes in scale efficiency. The authors find that 
U.S.  productivity  growth  is  a  little  higher  than  average  while  Japan  obtains  the  highest 
productivity growth rate. 
Our research employs this above non-parametric programming method to focus both 
on input-ratio convergence and TFP catching-up among 15 European countries (EU) and the 
US  over  the  period  1980-2004.  Compared  to  previous  studies  on  convergence,  one 
contribution of our research is to separate country TFP differences into two components: a 
technology effect and a scale effect and to study the catching-up processes on each of them. 
The convergence test relies on the distance variations of the countries to an increasing and/or 
decreasing  returns  to  scale  production  frontier  over  time.  These  movements  previously 
corrected of the scale effect bias, reflect or not a pure technological diffusion process. A 
second  contribution  is  to  measure  the  variations  in  capital/labor  mixes  over  time.  These 
movements enable to reveal structural inefficiencies due to changes in input-ratio differences 
signaling the role of a capital deepening or expanding result on technological transfer. A third 
originality  of  our  empirical  study  concerning  macroeconomic  data  is  to  separate  the 
information  and  communication  technology  from  others  capital-assets.  As  pointed  by 
Timmer, Ypma and van Ark (2003) all European countries have been, and still are, seriously 
lagging behind the US in the share of IT investment in GDP. This specific technological lag 
may  alter  international  TFP  comparisons  if  they  are  computed  from  the  usual  production 
frontier only considering the two usual labor and capital inputs. To test for convergence, we 
use  the  Nahar  and  Hinder  ’s  (2002)  time  series  procedure  which  estimates  a  catching-up 
parameter and identifies particular countries or sub-sets of countries within the group, which IÉSEG Working Paper Series 2008-ECO-1 
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might or not be converging. This paper is structured as follows. Using directional distance 
functions  to  conceptualize  the  west-wide  production  frontier,  the  next  section  recalls  the 
measures of the three effects which may influence the convergence process between the US 
and  European  countries  (respectively  technical  effect,  scale  effect  and  structural  effect). 
Section 3 connects these three effects to the technological diffusion process by developing a 
time series test consistent with the definition of convergence of an individual economy or a 
sub-set of nations within a group of countries and then presents the sample and discusses the 
statistical results. Conclusions appear in the final section. 
 
2. Analyzing convergence process with directional distance functions 
 
The objectives of the model is both to gauge a catching-up effect between observed 
TFP levels of countries and their own maximal feasible level of productivity and to evaluate a 
convergence process of input mixes among countries. While the former depends on social 
capabilities to adopt available technology, the latter which encompasses the heterogeneity 
across countries relative to their input accumulations and can be viewed as a proxy for a 
capital deepening or expanding effect. 
 
2.1. Definitions and concepts 
 
2.1.1. Technological catching up process and TFP convergence. 
Traditionally, the applied literature about technological adoption compares TFP levels 
across countries and tests an inverse relationship between growth TFP rates and their initial 
levels. Convergence in productivity levels turns out if countries with the lowest initial TFP 
have the highest growth rates: the followers catch up the leaders. This approach relies on an 
implicit  assumption  of  constant  returns  to  scale  (CRS)  since  the  optimal  TFP,  used  as  a 
benchmark  for  all  countries,  is  the  maximal  observed  productivity.  However,  if  the  CRS 
assumption does not hold and the production technology shows increasing and/or decreasing 
returns to scale (variable returns to scale, VRS), the maximal feasible level of TFP does not 
necessarily coincide with the maximal observed TFP and must be precisely gauged at the 
input level of each country. By assuming a CRS technology while a VRS technology prevails, 
some bias may be introduced in the analysis of technological diffusion. Indeed, a divergence 
in TFP levels can be observed while countries, reaching their production frontier, play a part 
in a technological catching up process as it is illustrated in Figure 1.  
- Figure 1 about here - 
 
In figure 1, three countries A, B and C produce one output (Y) from one input (X) under a 
variable returns to scale technology  VRS T . The observed levels of TFP for country B is easily 







  while  the  maximal  productivity  is  observed  for  country  A  which 
characterizes  the  most  productive  scale  size  (mpss).  If  we  consider  this  mpss  as  the 
benchmark  for  all  other  countries,  we  falsely  assume  a  CRS  technology.  In  that  case,  if 
countries B and C could come up to B
* and C
*, convergence TFP will arise since all countries 
achieve the same maximal TFP level.. However under the true VRS technology, countries 
will be able at best to reach B’ and C’. Thus, while B and C will never be observed at B
* and 
C
*, one will conclude to a divergence of TFP levels between these two countries. Indeed TFP 
change is higher for country C than for country B even though the former was initially more 
productive than the latter, a contradiction to the TFP convergence hypothesis. By considering 
the  true  VRS  technology  of  the  example  countries,  we  assume  that  the  maximal  feasible IÉSEG Working Paper Series 2008-ECO-1 
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productivity  levels  evaluated  at  B’  and  C’  onto  the  production  frontier  are  their  own 
respective optimal benchmarks rather than the mpss TFP level. Thus, a decrease with time in 
distances  between  countries  and  their  respective  benchmarks  onto  the  production  frontier 
denotes such a catching-up process to the maximal feasible productivity levels. One can note 
that traditional sigma or beta convergence tests on TFP levels are unable to point out this 
technological adoption effect. We will latter introduce the directional distance function to 
formally measure the distance of any production plan to the production frontier. 
In our approach, the technological catching-up process is independent from the usual 
technical change definition since we compare the observed levels of TFP to their current 
technological benchmark. Comparisons are therefore done within the same period and not 
across time. While shifts of the production frontier modify productivity levels, they do not 
interfere with our technological catching-up measure since technical progress affect uniformly 
any country and its benchmark onto the frontier. This is illustrated by Figure 2. While there is 
technical progress over the two periods, distances to the frontiers have not changed implying 
no technological catching-up. 
- Figure 2 about here - 
 
2.1.2 Structural inefficiency and convergence of input-mixes. 
We further illustrate the structural inefficiency effect in a multiple inputs case as a 
subtle source of inefficiency due to heterogeneity in factor accumulation among countries. 
Assume that two countries are technically efficient and also price efficient in the sense of 
Farrell (1957). Therefore no inefficiencies arise at the individual level. However, if countries 
face different price systems, it is clear that a kind of inefficiency prevails in the group of 
countries in line with the second welfare theorem. This market inefficiency is captured by a 
structural  inefficiency  component  as  shown  in  Figure  3.  Let  us  consider  two  countries 
production plans (A and B) which are represented in the input space producing the same level 
of outputs. While countries A and B are both technically and price efficient, there is still 
inefficiency at the aggregate level. This structural inefficiency is coming from differences in 
relative input allocations among the two countries. Indeed, in a perfect competition market, 
only  one  input  price  vector  has  to  coordinate  the  two  countries  and  this  structural  effect 
computes the inefficient market allocation in the spirit of the Debreu (1951) coefficient of 
resource utilization.  
- Figure 3 about here -  
 
Moreover, it would be interesting to measure the respective contributions of countries 
A and B to this global structural inefficiency and thus to split it between them. This can be 
done thanks to the shadow price system defined at the aggregate technology and then apply it 
at each national production plan. As shown in Figure 4, structural inefficiency evaluated at 
aggregated level can be decomposed as the sum of individual shadow price inefficiencies. 
- Figure 4 about here - 
 
Before turning to a formal presentation of the model we use to gauge the technical, 
scale  and  structural  effects  defined  above,  we  briefly  highlight  the  implications  of  these 
concepts  about  the  convergence  process  among  countries.  First,  a  decrease  of  technical 
inefficiency with time appears as a technological catching-up effect. Note, that we control for 
a  potential  countries’  size  bias  by  disentangling  scale  and  technical  effects.  Second,  the 
greater the structural inefficiency, the more heterogeneity we have in the input mixes between 
countries. Therefore, a decrease of structural inefficiency over time reveals a convergence 
towards a common expansion path linked to an input deepening effect. 
 IÉSEG Working Paper Series 2008-ECO-1 
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2.2 Measuring technical, scale and structural inefficiencies 
 
Formally, let 
N x R+ Î  denote the vector of inputs and 
M y R+ Î  the vector of outputs for 
a country. As we compare European nations and the US which have a rather similar degree of 
economic development, countries are assumed to face the same technology represented by its 
production set T : 
{ } ( , ):  can produce  T x y x y =    (1) 
The total group of countries (G ) is composed of  K  countries  ( 1 ) k …K = , . The aggregate 
technology at the group level inherits its properties from the country technology. Formally, 
we define the group technology 








=∑   (2) 
It is possible to prove that the aggregate CRS technology is equal to the individual CRS 









= = ∑   (3) 
Li (1995) also showed that, if convexity holds then the VRS aggregate technology is equal to 







T T K T
=
= = ´ ∑   (4) 
We now turn to the definition of the directional distance function which measures 
distances  between  observed  production  plans  and  the  boundary  of  the  technology.  These 
distances are interpreted as gaps between observed TFP levels and their maximal feasible or 
desired levels of TFP. The function  ( ) ( )
M N M N
T D R R R R R + + + + + : ´ ´ - ´ ¾®  defined by: 
{ } ( , ; ; ) sup : ( , ) , T x y x y D x y g g x g y g T
l
l l l + = ÎÂ - × + × Î
r
   (5) 
is called the directional distance function where  ( ; ) x y g g  is a nonzero vector that determines 
the direction in which  () T D ×
r
 is defined. An analysis of the properties of directional distance 
functions  can  be  found  in  Chambers  et  al.  (1996).  Note  that 
( ) ( , ; ; ) 0 T x y x y T D x y g g , Î Ü⇒ ³
r
. Thus, it is possible to characterize the production set from 
the directional distance function.  
For estimation purposes, we follow the literature on non-parametric frontier estimation 
by specifying an operational definition of T  based on a set of observed countries and a set of 
axioms which add some structure to the definition of  T  in (1). As motivated above, we 
consider here a convex production set satisfying free disposability of inputs and outputs. We 
allow  various  returns  to  scale  assumption  in  order  to  decompose  the  TFP  gap  between 














T x y x R y R y z y m M





= , : Î , Î , ³ , = ,..., , 

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  (6) 
Under variable returns to scale,  VRS T  is defined as: IÉSEG Working Paper Series 2008-ECO-1 
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  (7) 
Concerning the directional distance function, we use the group output vector to construct the 








  ∑ . Therefore, technical and scale inefficiencies 
are computed as percentages of the aggregated GDP of the total group of countries (Dervaux 
et al., 2004). 
For a specific country 
' ' ( , )
k k x y , the productivity gap is defined on a CRS technology by 





D x y y
Î ∑
r
and  next  can  be  decomposed  between  a  technical  component  and  a 
scale  component.  Technical  efficiency  is  defined  relatively  to  a  VRS  technology  by 





D x y y
Î ∑
r
.  The  scale  component  is  computed  as  a  residual  between  the  two 
latter’s  measures.  These  two  distance  functions  are  computed  by  the  following  linear 
programs (LPs): 








( , ;0; ) max

















D x y y
st z y y y m M


















  (LP1) 
 









( , ;0; ) max





















D x y y
st z y y y m M





















L   (LP2) 
 
The structural efficiency part of the productivity gap is defined at the group level and 
is based on the difference between the technical inefficiency evaluated at the aggregated level 
and  the  sum  of  individual  technical  efficiencies  defined  by 
' '
' 1
( , ;0, ) ( , ;0; ) G
VRS VRS
K
k k k k k k
T T
k G k G k G k G k
D x y y D x y y
Î Î Î Î =
- ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
r r
  where  the  former  component  is 
computed by the following LP. IÉSEG Working Paper Series 2008-ECO-1 
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L   (LP3) 
 
While  technical  and  scale  efficiencies  are  country-specific,  structural  efficiency  is 
computed for the whole group. We can allocate structural inefficiency across countries by 
using the shadow prices derived in LP3. Indeed, it can be shown that structural inefficiency 
can be decomposed in individual effects as the countries’ price inefficiency computed with 
the shadow prices derived from the aggregate technology (Briec and al., 2003). 
 
3 Efficiency Convergence between the US and European countries  
 
In this section, we investigate the process of efficiency convergence across leading 
countries  at  the  macroeconomic  level  thanks  to  the  following  procedure.  In  a  first  step, 









are  used  to  measure  rates  of  change  of  the 
three components of efficiency (technical, scale and structural). Hence, for each year and each 
country of the sample, efficiency gaps are then defined as the distances between each nation 
and the west-wide frontier. In a second step, following Nahar and Inder (2002), we develop a 
time  series  test  estimating  catching-up  effects  based  on  a  statistical  procedure  which  is 
consistent with the definition of convergence. This test considers convergence as movements 
towards a group of leaders located on a production frontier. Our procedure is well adapted to 
check for technical and structural adoption of an individual economy or a sub-set of nations 
within a group of countries. Thereof we are able to differentiate the European zone from the 
US in the convergence process analysis.  
 
3.1 A Time Series Test Procedure for Efficiency Catching-up Effects 
 
The catching-up hypothesis between a country k and its benchmark involves that the 
long-run average of the efficiency gap or distance  ( , )
t k k
T t t D x y
r
converges to zero with time: 
+
+ + ®¥ =
r
l lim   ( ( , )) 0
t l k k






t l k k





( ( , ))
0
t k k
T t t D x y
t
  (9) 
Therefore, the signs of slopes (9) allow us to evaluate the catching-up process of a particular 





t l k k
T t l t l D x y   series  may  not  decrease  uniformly  with  time,  the 
average of these slopes should be negative if the country tends to catch up its productive 
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One can estimate (10) with a function of time trend t as:  
=
= + = + ∑
r
0
( , ) ( ) .
P
t k k k p k
T t t t p t
p
D x y f t µ a t µ   (11) 
where the ap’s are parameters and 
k
t µ  is an error term with zero mean.  
From equation (11), the average slope function is: 
w w
w
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Equation (11) is estimated by ordinary least squares to complete a t-test of this restriction on 
the a  vector. 
 
3.2 Data  
 
Data come from the GGDC Total Economy Growth Accounting Database (Timmer, 
Ypma and van Ark, 2003). We use series for the US and the following 15 European countries: 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom (UK) over the period 1980-
2004. To specify the west-wide technology we retain one output and three inputs: added value 
expressed in international prices (base year 2000), total worked hours as labor, information 
and  communication  equipments  (ICT)  and  other  equipments  (non  ICT),  expressed  in 
international prices (base year 2000). Over the whole period, one can note that the European 
average annual growth rates for GDP as well for worked hours are lower than the American 
ones. Except for Luxembourg, which is a very specific economy, only Ireland does better than 
the US with a GDP growth rate of 5.9%. The large European countries as UK, Germany and 
France are clearly in lower part of the US. On the other hand, both for ICT and non ICT 
equipments, rates of growth are similar between the two zones although there is a rather great 
heterogeneity within Europe. For ICT equipment, the US, Ireland and Finland experience the 
strongest rates of growth. For the other types of capital, the fastest evolutions are for Spain, 
Ireland, Portugal and France.  
-  Table 1 about here – 
 
As  a  first  exploratory  analysis,  the  evolutions  of  partial  labor  productivity  at  an 
aggregated level for Europe and the US are plotted in Figure 5. This ratio was initially higher 
for the US but the differential rate of growth favors of Europe (respectively 1.7% and 2.1%) 
aims at similar levels until the middle of nineties. Then US labor productivity has again risen 




Concerning  capital  deepening  effects,  ratios  of  nonICT  and  ICT  over  labor  are 
presented in Figures 6 and 7. For nonICT ratio, Europe has a significant higher growth rate 
than  the  US  over  the  whole  period  and  a  convergence  process  clearly  appears  until  the 
beginning of the nineties. However, this was followed by an increasing divergence effect 
along the nineties during which Europe has become more capital intensive than the US. A 
different picture arises for ICT ratio. A slow but regular convergence is observed over the past 
twenty five years. However, the US have still an upper ratio of IT/Labor. 
 
- Figure 5, 6 and 7 about here - 
 
Beyond these preliminary observations, more formal analyses, presented above in the 
methodological  section,  are  required  to  encompass  all  individual  countries  and  take 
simultaneously into account all inputs in productivity and capital deepening global measures.  
 
3.3 Results and discussion 
 
Annual  production  frontiers  are  calculated  by  linear  programs  LP1,  LP2  and  LP3 
associated  to  their  respective  directional  distance  functions  permitting  the  evaluation  of 
technical,  scale  and  structural  efficiency  scores  for  each  individual  country  or  group  of 
countries. For each year of the period the US, UK, France and Luxembourg are located on the 
production frontier. This result points out that while there may be statistical evidence that the 
US are still a technological leader at the aggregate level (Taskin and Zaim, 1997), several 
countries are also high productive performances and constitute referents for the west-wide 
benchmark.  
 
Before embarking in the results interpretation we recall that the directional distance 
function is based on the group output vector. Therefore, technical and scale inefficiencies are 
computed as percentages of the aggregated GDP of the total group of countries. Hence an 
inefficiency score of 1% means that the country could improve its output by 1% of the output 
sum of all countries which represents for example 10% to 20% of its own output. We chose 
this directional distance function instead of a usual radial one to enable aggregation of country 
scores and thus to perform a meaningful catching-up analysis. of total factor productivity.  
 
On average, technical inefficiency is about 2.9% for the total aggregation of countries 
meaning that if all nations adopted the best productive practices and aligned onto the VRS 
benchmark, TFP of the aggregated zone could improve from nearly 3%. A great part of this 
technical  inefficiency  comes  from  Germany  which,  although  being  the  greatest  European 
economy,  underwent  the  shock  of  the  ex  GDR  integration  during  the  beginning  of  the 
nineties.  
 
Scale inefficiency exceeds 9% and is equally shared between Europe and the US. The 
high level of this component illustrates clearly the difficulty for countries to improve their 
TFP level by converging to a mpss evaluated under a hypothetical constant returns to scale 
production frontier. Macroeconomic data regroup countries so different in size as the US and 
Luxembourg or Ireland that TFP comparisons should obviously take into account this scale 
bias.  Indeed  individual  countries  will  never  reach  such  a  supposed  mediate  mpss  by 
drastically increasing or reducing their own economic size.  
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Structural inefficiency is nearly 4.6%, meaning that if all countries adopted a common 
input-mix,  the  TFP  level  of  the  aggregated  group  would  improve  of  the  same  amount. 
Structural inefficiency predominates technical effect showing that the capital deepening effect 
is still playing a major role in the convergence debate. This conclusion can be related to the 
IT/Labor ratio for which most of developed countries have not even now caught up the US 
accumulation level. This inefficiency component is distributed between Europe and the US 
for respectively 70% and 30%. 
The aggregated inefficiency scores are plotted in Figure 8. While scale inefficiency 
increases with time, there is evidence in favor of a convergence process for both technical and 
structural  efficiencies.  In  fact,  as  we  said  before,  studies  about  TFP  catching-up  among 
countries should eliminate the bias due to the scale effect. The structural component seems to 
converge faster than the technical one. Actually, these results are strongly influenced by the 
specific behavior of the US which differs from that of the European zone. Located on the 
VRS benchmark throughout the period, this country does not take part within the movement 
of technological catching-up. On the other hand, decreasing its structural inefficiency quickly, 
it explains a great part of structural convergence. As for Europe, two convergence processes 
can be observed over the whole period. From the beginning of the eighties to the end of the 
nineties, the European zone has steadily improved its level of efficiency and has caught up the 
US.  However,  since  the  year  2000,  its  technical  inefficiency  has  been  increasing  and 
diverging from the American one. The European structural convergence has been effective 
until the beginning of the nineties, then it roughly stopped between 1994 and 1996, starting 
again for the nine last years. 
The simple observation of these irregular and specific evolutions does not enable to 
clearly  conclude  on  the  convergence  hypothesis  for  technical  as  well  for  structural 
inefficiencies. Therefore, the time series test exposed in 3.1 must be performed on these two 
effects. 
The significant negative estimates of average slopes (Table 3) reinforce and precise 
our first conclusions based on the previous chart analysis. First at the aggregated level, the 
estimator  of  average  slopes  for  structural  inefficiency  is  twice  higher  than  one  for  the 
technical component estimated under a VRS technology. According to Figure 8 it clearly 
indicates  a  faster  catching-up  process  for  that  structural  component.  This  differential  of 
variation  rates  can  be  explained  as  following:  the  US  who  are  on  their  technical  frontier 
throughout the period do not take any part in technological adoption among countries whereas 
being given its great economic influence it strongly weighs within the structural efficiency 
convergence. Second, the non significant slopes for the technical inefficiency measured under 
a CRS technology hide the technological catching-up effect across European countries and the 
US.  This  result  illustrates  plainly  the  scale  bias  introduced  into  technological  diffusion 
evaluation established on traditional comparisons of TFP levels. Third, one can note that the 
absolute  value  of  the  average  slope  for  the  American  structural  component  is  three  time 
greater than the European one; although the latter is also significantly negative in spite of a 
clear rupture of tendency in 1996. Fourth, technical efficiency divergence between Europe 
and the US, noted at the beginning of the years 2000, do not erase the catching-up effect 
which took place during the previous twenty years. Therefore, over the whole time period of 
our  sample,  the  technical  efficiency  average  slope  remained  significantly  negative.  This 
European evolution is primarily due to the German productivity convergence, while the UK 
and France are located on the border not taking part in this catching-up process. 
- Table 2 about here - 
 
- Figure 8 about here - 
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- Table 3 about here - 
 
- Figure 9 and 10 about here - 
 
These results mean that the finding by Bernard and Durlauf (1995) generally rejected 
the  convergence  hypothesis  of  OECD  countries  using  standard  time  series  techniques  on 
productivity  indexes  does  not  hold  anymore  when  using  technical  gaps  calculated  by  a 
nonparametric VRS distance function method and when the US are not a priori considered as 
the solely technology leader. Our conclusions are rather close to those found by Evans and 
Karras (1996) and Nahar and Inder (2002), who criticized the above time series approach, in 
favor of strong convergence for the developed  countries. Moreover, we find a significant 
effect of input-mix convergence across economies to a common west-wide price structure. 
Therefore, as regards to the catching-up process at the macroeconomic level, there is evidence 




We re-examined the convergence hypothesis at the macroeconomic level across the 
most  developed  European  countries  and  the  US  using  directional  distance  functions.  In 
comparison with other studies, the substantial differences of our analysis are that we use a 
productivity  change  component  which  impose  no  a  priori  constants  returns  to  scale 
assumption, nor any functional form on technology, and any restrictive assumptions on input 
price to evaluate both technological gaps and input-mix differences between nations or subset 
of countries and the west-wide production frontier.  
Our  results  definitely  demonstrate  that  analyses  of  technological  adoption  derived 
from statistical tests on TFP levels are biased since they rely on an implicit constant returns to 
scale  assumption.  This  assumption  appears  too  restrictive  if  productivity  comparisons  are 
established  among  countries  with  dissimilar  sizes.  Moreover,  while  the  US  are  on  the 
production  frontier  during  the  whole  period,  they  are  not  the  only  benchmark  for  other 
countries. Under variable returns to scale, some small nations such as Luxembourg or Ireland 
and some medium size economies as France and UK also serve as benchmarks for countries.  
We also find that structural inefficiency predominates technical effect. Therefore, we 
can conclude that regarding the convergence issue, the capital deepening effect still plays a 
major role especially when IT equipments is split from the traditional capital assets.  
Thanks to a time series procedure studying convergence processes among nations, we 
can highlight statistical evidence of technological diffusion as well as structural convergence 
between  European  countries  and  the  US.  Furthermore,  statistically  significant  structural 
catching-up effects for both Europe and the US are established but geographic differences in 
the rate of diffusion of technology are also found. 
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Figure 1. TFP measure and its decomposition into technical and scale effects 
 
X    
CRS  T 
 
  
Y    
A    




*    
mpss    
0 
C’    
C* 
  
B’    
























Figure 2. Technical progress and technological catching-up 
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Figure 4. The measurement of structural efficiency 
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Figure 8. Comparing different inefficiency score variations 
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Table 1. Average Annual Growth Rates (1980-2004) 
Country  GDP  Worked Hours  Total Capital 
ICT 
equipment  non ICT equipment 
Austria  2.36%  0.20%  2.90%  8.01%  2.74% 
Belgium  2.18%  0.05%  1.66%  12.63%  1.39% 
Denmark  2.07%  -0.03%  2.75%  12.24%  2.52% 
Finland  2.08%  -0.58%  1.77%  13.29%  1.48% 
France  2.07%  -0.05%  3.21%  10.45%  3.08% 
Germany  2.10%  -0.60%  1.85%  7.20%  1.70% 
Greece  1.94%  0.68%  2.60%  9.63%  2.44% 
Ireland  5.92%  1.43%  3.80%  13.94%  3.63% 
Italy  1.86%  0.19%  2.63%  9.98%  2.40% 
Luxembourg  5.32%  2.54%  4.92%  10.37%  4.77% 
Netherlands  2.67%  1.23%  1.95%  11.10%  1.79% 
Portugal  2.94%  0.49%  3.64%  10.59%  3.44% 
Spain  3.03%  1.36%  4.56%  11.48%  4.42% 
Sweden  2.17%  0.20%  2.24%  10.28%  1.96% 
UK  2.69%  0.37%  2.91%  13.61%  2.59% 
US  3.29%  1.56%  2.74%  10.34%  2.36% 
Europe  2.32%  0.19%  2.69%  10.01%  2.50% 




Table 2. Inefficiency scores (Average 1980-2004) 
Country  Technical  Scale  Structural 
Austria  0.11%  0.13% 0.03% 
Belgium  0.09%  0.10% 0.13% 
Denmark  0.07%  0.05% 0.04% 
Finland  0.19%  0.04% 0.06% 
France  0.00%  0.13% 0.19% 
Germany  1.25%  1.87% 0.63% 
Greece  0.31%  0.14% 0.20% 
Ireland  0.00%  0.00% 0.07% 
Italy  0.04%  0.61% 0.00% 
Luxembourg  0.00%  0.00% 0.02% 
Netherlands  0.04%  0.05% 0.23% 
Portugal  0.02%  0.03% 0.42% 
Spain  0.46%  0.56% 0.49% 
Sweden  0.27%  0.09% 0.01% 
UK  0.00%  0.44% 0.70% 
US  0.00%  4.90% 1.39% 
Europe  2.85%  4.26% 3.22% 
Total   2.85%  9.16% 4.61% 
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Table 3. Estimates of average slopes and t-ratios for testing efficiency convergence 














US        US  11  -29.3E-04  -3.12 
Europe  11  -9.9E-04  -2.38  Europe  6  -9.0E-04   -2.93  
Total  11  -9.9E-04  -2.38  Total  10  -23.0E-04  -2.72 


















US  12  -8.83E-04  -0.50   US  12  -8.83.0E-04  -0.50 
Europe  12   8.86E-04   0.81  Europe  12  -1.02E-04   -0.09  
Total  12   0.04E-04   0.14  Total  12  -9.85E-04  -0.44 
 
 